Sunday, August 06, 2006
More on a misunderstood Syria
In Baltimore, we have an attorney who used to advertise his services with the catch phrase: Let’s talk about it. That’s a succinct way of summing up the foreign policy strategy of many of this administration’s critics.
“Former officials charge that the administration has missed numerous opportunities to encourage Syria and Iran to cooperate more closely with U.S. interests.
“This has constrained U.S. foreign policy in many damaging ways," said Flynt Leverett, a White House official during President Bush's first term who said he argued unsuccessfully for deeper engagement with Syria. "The United States does not have effective diplomatic channels for managing the situation, much less resolving it." Critics Cite 'Constrained' Mideast Policy
Mr. Leverett worked with the National Security Council for one year (3/02 – 3/03) and then left to join the Brookings Institution where he “focus[ed] on the politics of Syria and the Levant and Syria's role in the war on terrorism and in the Middle East peace process.” Flynt Leverett...Joins Brookings Saban Center as Visiting Fellow In other words, the bigger role assigned to Syria, the bigger punditry role for the likes of Mr. Leveret. Anyway, Mr. Leverett’s status as a former administration official gives him great cache and the Post uses him a lot here:
“But critics of the administration's approach say the administration has simply lectured countries such as Syria, refusing to detail concrete benefits that might flow from closer cooperation. Leverett, now at the New America Foundation, interviewed Syria's president, Bashar al-Assad, for a book after he left the White House and said Assad complained that all he heard from U.S. officials was a long list of demands.
Syria is "a state, not a charity," Assad told Leverett. "If it is going to give something up, it must know what it will get in return."
I don’t know what is about Assad that people who write books about him invariably conclude we just got to talk with him more but Mr. Leverett is the second in the last few weeks to come to this very conclusion (Maryland Conservatarian: Syria's Assad not taken seriously; Bush to blame). Here’s an example of what they mean:
“For instance, administration officials have always demanded that Syria prevent militant groups from operating on its territory but have never explained what Syria would get in return. Leverett said the administration should have explicitly linked Syria's removal from the list of state sponsors of terrorism to its expelling groups such as Hamas and severing the links that allow arms to flow to Hezbollah.”
Without any fear that this one will come back to haunt me, I can't see myself criticizing this or any other administration for demanding that nation-states “prevent militant groups from operating on its territory.” Nor am I of the belief that accession to such a demand is worthy of praise and rewards. Frankly, such behavior should be considered as the minimum expected of a country.
This being the Washington Post, we then get our dose of nostalgia – remember how much better things were when Mr. Clinton was in charge?
“Syria also could be induced to cooperate if it receives some acknowledgment that it has a role in an Arab-Israeli peace deal, experts said. Syria nearly reached a peace agreement with Israel during the Clinton administration, but the Bush administration has been reluctant to involve Syria in its peace efforts.”
I think their use of the word “nearly” severely stretches its everyday meaning. This is an obvious reference to the Shepherdstown WV talks which ended with Mr. Clinton’s meeting with Assad in Geneva in March of 2000. Here’s the White House spokesman assessing just how “nearly” peace was achieved in our time:
"The differences are significant and important, and obviously more work needs to be done in order to bridge them," said White House spokesman Joe Lockhart. Assad rebuffs Clinton on Mideast peace
I believe this Administration has learned from the failures of others in the past. Sure, Syria wants to talk…but that’s all they want to do. All their contributions to world peace are pretty much limited to taking a seat and chatting it up:
“Richard N. Haass, the State Department's director of policy planning in Bush's first term and now president of the Council on Foreign Relations, noted that after intense diplomatic engagement, Syria in the 1990s joined the coalition that ousted Iraq from Kuwait and was the first country to accept the U.S. invitation to join an Arab-Israeli peace conference in Madrid.”
Such gushing should be embarrassing. There was no way Syria was going to be helpful to Iraq in the first Gulf War - Iraq was clamoring for Syria to get out of Lebanon and a Saddam Hussein with even more oil money to build up his military was not likely to be of any comfort to Syria’s senior Assad. And the invitation to join the Madrid talks in 1991 was co-signed by the Soviet Union, a prime supplier of Syrian military hardware. How could Syria say no?
Although the authors do mention the suspicion of Syria’s role in the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, they don’t mention other suspicions such as the transfer of WMDs to Syria (Captain's Quarters) or Syria’s hiding of high-level Iraqi officials after the war (BBC NEWS Middle East Iraqi general backs Syria charges).
These aren't insignificant hurdles to the treating of Syria as a respected nation-state. I’ll be amenable to including them in some meaningful talks when someone can point me to any recent evidence of positive Syrian actions beyond their vague expressions of a willingness to “talk about it.”
“Former officials charge that the administration has missed numerous opportunities to encourage Syria and Iran to cooperate more closely with U.S. interests.
“This has constrained U.S. foreign policy in many damaging ways," said Flynt Leverett, a White House official during President Bush's first term who said he argued unsuccessfully for deeper engagement with Syria. "The United States does not have effective diplomatic channels for managing the situation, much less resolving it." Critics Cite 'Constrained' Mideast Policy
Mr. Leverett worked with the National Security Council for one year (3/02 – 3/03) and then left to join the Brookings Institution where he “focus[ed] on the politics of Syria and the Levant and Syria's role in the war on terrorism and in the Middle East peace process.” Flynt Leverett...Joins Brookings Saban Center as Visiting Fellow In other words, the bigger role assigned to Syria, the bigger punditry role for the likes of Mr. Leveret. Anyway, Mr. Leverett’s status as a former administration official gives him great cache and the Post uses him a lot here:
“But critics of the administration's approach say the administration has simply lectured countries such as Syria, refusing to detail concrete benefits that might flow from closer cooperation. Leverett, now at the New America Foundation, interviewed Syria's president, Bashar al-Assad, for a book after he left the White House and said Assad complained that all he heard from U.S. officials was a long list of demands.
Syria is "a state, not a charity," Assad told Leverett. "If it is going to give something up, it must know what it will get in return."
I don’t know what is about Assad that people who write books about him invariably conclude we just got to talk with him more but Mr. Leverett is the second in the last few weeks to come to this very conclusion (Maryland Conservatarian: Syria's Assad not taken seriously; Bush to blame). Here’s an example of what they mean:
“For instance, administration officials have always demanded that Syria prevent militant groups from operating on its territory but have never explained what Syria would get in return. Leverett said the administration should have explicitly linked Syria's removal from the list of state sponsors of terrorism to its expelling groups such as Hamas and severing the links that allow arms to flow to Hezbollah.”
Without any fear that this one will come back to haunt me, I can't see myself criticizing this or any other administration for demanding that nation-states “prevent militant groups from operating on its territory.” Nor am I of the belief that accession to such a demand is worthy of praise and rewards. Frankly, such behavior should be considered as the minimum expected of a country.
This being the Washington Post, we then get our dose of nostalgia – remember how much better things were when Mr. Clinton was in charge?
“Syria also could be induced to cooperate if it receives some acknowledgment that it has a role in an Arab-Israeli peace deal, experts said. Syria nearly reached a peace agreement with Israel during the Clinton administration, but the Bush administration has been reluctant to involve Syria in its peace efforts.”
I think their use of the word “nearly” severely stretches its everyday meaning. This is an obvious reference to the Shepherdstown WV talks which ended with Mr. Clinton’s meeting with Assad in Geneva in March of 2000. Here’s the White House spokesman assessing just how “nearly” peace was achieved in our time:
"The differences are significant and important, and obviously more work needs to be done in order to bridge them," said White House spokesman Joe Lockhart. Assad rebuffs Clinton on Mideast peace
I believe this Administration has learned from the failures of others in the past. Sure, Syria wants to talk…but that’s all they want to do. All their contributions to world peace are pretty much limited to taking a seat and chatting it up:
“Richard N. Haass, the State Department's director of policy planning in Bush's first term and now president of the Council on Foreign Relations, noted that after intense diplomatic engagement, Syria in the 1990s joined the coalition that ousted Iraq from Kuwait and was the first country to accept the U.S. invitation to join an Arab-Israeli peace conference in Madrid.”
Such gushing should be embarrassing. There was no way Syria was going to be helpful to Iraq in the first Gulf War - Iraq was clamoring for Syria to get out of Lebanon and a Saddam Hussein with even more oil money to build up his military was not likely to be of any comfort to Syria’s senior Assad. And the invitation to join the Madrid talks in 1991 was co-signed by the Soviet Union, a prime supplier of Syrian military hardware. How could Syria say no?
Although the authors do mention the suspicion of Syria’s role in the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, they don’t mention other suspicions such as the transfer of WMDs to Syria (Captain's Quarters) or Syria’s hiding of high-level Iraqi officials after the war (BBC NEWS Middle East Iraqi general backs Syria charges).
These aren't insignificant hurdles to the treating of Syria as a respected nation-state. I’ll be amenable to including them in some meaningful talks when someone can point me to any recent evidence of positive Syrian actions beyond their vague expressions of a willingness to “talk about it.”
